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🗓️ 13 June 2017
⏱️ 6 minutes
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0:00.0 | Hello, welcome to the Tuesday, June 13th, 2017 edition of the Santernet Storm Center's Stormcast. My name is Johannes Ulrich, and today I'm recording from Washington, D.C. |
0:13.2 | ESAT and Tragos security released an analysis of malware that was found to disrupt power networks in the Ukraine. |
0:23.5 | The malware was originally found by ESET, who named it Industroar. |
0:28.1 | According to ESET, the malware was responsible for power outages in the Ukraine in December last year. |
0:36.0 | Only a single substation was affected by the attack at the time, |
0:41.2 | and Tarragos suggests that the attack was more of a proof of concept to test the capabilities |
0:47.9 | of this Malvern. Unlike prior malware, found to attack industrial control systems, for example, Black Energy 2, |
0:56.9 | which was responsible for the attacks in the Ukraine in 2015, this new malware is very modular. |
1:05.0 | It loads specific modules where each module is written to attack a specific industrial system control protocol. |
1:13.4 | The malware uses HTTP for command and control. |
1:16.8 | The HTTP requests are sent to a proxy inside the company's network, |
1:22.3 | and then Tor is used to protect the destination of the requests. |
1:31.3 | The command and control channel can be used to execute typical commands, like executing commands on the infected systems, |
1:36.3 | copying files on the infected systems. |
1:39.3 | However, the malware does not offer a built-in command to exfiltrate data. This could be installed later, |
1:46.3 | but it also shows how this particular malware focuses on disrupting the system, less on |
1:53.2 | exfiltrating information. An attacker would initiate an attack against a power company by loading |
1:59.5 | a configuration file specific to the company's network, |
2:04.5 | and then the attacker is able to, for example, the energized power lines, essentially turning off power for |
2:11.1 | part of the network, or initiate what Tregos calls an islanding event. In this scenario, power is cycled quickly multiple |
2:21.0 | times to trigger the power network's self-protection mechanism and disconnect the system from |
2:27.8 | the larger power network. According to Traygos, this could lead to multi-day power outages. |
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