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🗓️ 28 September 2023
⏱️ 7 minutes
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0:00.0 | Hello and welcome to the Thursday, September 28, 2023 edition of the Sansonet Storm Center's Stormcast. My name is Johannes Ulrich and today I'm recording from Jacksonville, Florida. |
0:15.2 | But we got an interesting new side channel attack. In this case, it's affecting GPUs, not CPUs. Of course, we had a bunch of |
0:25.1 | different side channel attacks over the last few years in CPUs. Well, GPUs, overall, shouldn't |
0:31.3 | really be all that different. And so no real big surprise that it affects GPUs, but the kind of vulnerability here is |
0:40.2 | sort of unique to GPUs. |
0:43.6 | GPUs are often compressing traffic. |
0:46.6 | Of course, video traffic is known to compress fairly well. |
0:51.1 | And as so often, the ratio at which content compresses allows you to deduct |
0:58.7 | some properties of the content itself. What makes this paper even sort of more amazing is that |
1:06.2 | they actually managed to implement this attack in a web browser. Web browsers are trying really hard |
1:14.7 | to separate data loaded from different web pages or different origins. As a result, if you have |
1:22.6 | two windows open, well, JavaScript in one of those windows cannot access the other window if these two pages were loaded from different origins. |
1:33.4 | What they demonstrated here in the paper is that they were able to load a page. |
1:39.1 | They used Wikipedia as an example into an eye frame, and then the page that contained the eye frame was able to |
1:48.7 | deduct content of the page inside the eye frame, which, well, shouldn't be possible in a sort of |
1:56.6 | proof of concept. They were able to read the username. Now, they picked the username here because |
2:02.1 | it wasn't a very specific location of the page. This attack is like many side channel attacks, |
2:08.1 | not very fast. Speed and accuracy depends a lot on the screen resolution as well as on the |
2:14.5 | CPU and GPU being used here. The fastest they had was two pixels per second, but with a 99.6% accuracy. Some of the slower ones are going down to like 0.2 pixels per second. So basically it takes you 5 seconds to deduct the content of a single pixel. |
2:38.1 | Still for a proof of concept, that's certainly not bad and certainly useful to, for example, read content, |
2:46.0 | like in this case usernames or other confidential data from another page that the script running on the attackers' web page should not have access to. |
2:56.6 | I will, of course, link to the paper in the show notes. |
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