I would suggest that the Russian military was quite adaptable beforehand, but it was adaptable

in a really narrow part of the force. And that's all a reactive process. I don't see in the Russian

military that horizon scanning driving adaptation.

So what you're actually seeing is the development of things like a firing carousel between Russian guns.

You are seeing integration of infantry mortars with heavier howitzers and a much more slick process of fire.

Hey, welcome back to the Modern War Institute podcast. I'm John Ambo, editorial director at

MWI, and I'm joined on this episode by Dr. Jack Watley. He is a senior research fellow for

land warfare at the Royal United Services Institute, and he is also

the author of a fascinating, recently published report on how Russian forces have adapted

tactically over the course of the war in Ukraine.

In many ways, the war has not gone well for the Russian military, and that has forced it

to adapt, doing things differently, in some cases very differently, than the tactics

enshrined in Russian military doctrine. From the organization of infantry forces to improving

integration between drones and artillery, to reducing the detectability of tanks, Dr. Watling

describes the specific adaptations on display by Russian forces. He also describes the practical processes by which these

adaptations actually take place and explains what this means for Ukraine and from a policy

perspective what it means for Ukraine's international supporters. Before we get to the discussion,

as always, a couple quick notes. First, if you're not yet subscribed to the MWI podcast,

you can find it on Apple Podcast, sit your tune, tune in, Spotify, or your favorite podcast app.

And second, as always, what you hear in this episode are the views of the participants

and don't represent those of West Point, the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. government.

All right, here's my conversation with Dr. Jack Watley.

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