We will hear argument first this morning in case 23102, Hewitt v. United States, and the consolidated case.

Mr. Kimberly.

Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, after decades of urging by sentencing judges and the sentencing commission,

Congress, in 2018, enacted Section 403 of the First Step Act.

The point of Section 403 was to override deal against United States, which called for

extraordinarily harsh mandatory minimum sentences even for first-time offenders.

In enacting this override, Congress had to balance two countervailing values.

First, justice in sentencing, and second, finality of judgments.

Congress struck the balance in 403B by making 403A retroactively applicable to offenders

whose conduct predated the act, but whose cases were pending and

non-final as of that date, those for whom, quote, a sentence for the offense has not been

imposed. For at least four reasons that language calls for application of 403A to all post-enactment plenary sentencing proceedings, including plenary resentencings

following vacatur.

First, a sentence that has been imposed does not include a sentence that has been vacated,

because a sentence that has been vacated is treated as though it never was imposed.

Second, Congress's use of the present perfect tense with the preposition as of connotes an ongoing condition.

It makes no sense to say that a sentence has been imposed as of the date of enactment,

but that it has since been vacated.

Third, the statutory structure confirms that when Congress wishes to accomplish the objective that the amicus is defending,

it uses the past tense and a different preposition.

And finally, Your Honors, the rules of statutory construction do not require the Court to turn a blind eye to common sense.

Amicus's interpretation produces an anomalous result, which there is no evidence Congress intended, and it's one that is flatly contrary to its acknowledged purpose.

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