We'll hear argument next in case 24345, FS Credit Opportunities Corporation versus Sabot Capital Master Fund.

Mr. Korefsky.

Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, to imply a private right of action in Section 47B, Congress would have needed to speak clearly and unambiguously.

It did not.

Start with the text.

Section 47B doesn't come near the high bar for an implied private right of action.

Congress knew how to speak clearly to create a right of action, just as it did in sections

30H and 36B.

Congress could have said an action may be brought by any

party to a contract that violates the ICA. Instead, Congress chose language that specifies

what remedy is available to parties already before the Court. Section 47B applies only if a

contract is unenforceable, an inherently defensive concept. And Section 47B applies only if a contract is unenforceable, an inherently defensive concept.

And Section 47B2 focuses on courts, not who can sue.

It uses the term instance, which ordinarily means a request, not a right, to bring in action.

Indeed, Congress rewrote Section 47B after TAMA, eliminating the phrase shall be

void that TAMA had held created a private right of action under the IAA.

Statutory structure points in the same direction.

It makes no sense to think that, on the one hand, Congress expressly specified narrow

rights of action for particular plaintiffs in 36H and 30H and 36B.

But on the other hand, Congress subtly implied a private right of action for any party to a

contract to enforce any provision of the ICA in 47B.

What's more, Congress vested the SEC with an array of powers to enforce the ICA

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