Executive Summary to Volume 1 (Mueller Report)
Government Unfiltered
Dan Williams
4.8 • 993 Ratings
🗓️ 6 May 2019
⏱️ 22 minutes
🧾️ Download transcript
Summary
On April 18, 2019, the Department of Justice released the "Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election." This section covers the "Executive Summary to Volume 1" from pages 4 to 10 of the report.
Russian Social Media Campaign (0:10)
Russian Hacking Operations (1:47)
Russian Contacts with the Campaign (3:52)
2015 Russian Contacts with the Campaign (5:00)
Spring 2016 Russian Contacts with the Campaign (5:30)
Summer 2016 Russian Contacts with the Campaign (6:14)
Fall 2016 Russian Contacts with the Campaign (9:18)
Post-2016 Election Russian Contacts with the Campaign (10:13)
The Special Counsel's Charging Decisions (14:38)
Mueller Report Audio - muellerreportaudio.com
Presented by Timberlane Media
Support via PayPal: donate@timberlanemedia.com
Transcript
Click on a timestamp to play from that location
| 0:00.0 | Welcome to the Mueller Report Audio. |
| 0:07.6 | Executive summary to volume one. |
| 0:09.9 | Russian social media campaign. |
| 0:12.1 | The Internet Research Agency, IRA, carried out the earliest Russian interference operations identified by the investigation. |
| 0:19.0 | A social media campaign designed to provoke and amplify political and social discord in the United States. |
| 0:24.8 | The IRA was based in St. Petersburg, Russia, and received funding from Russian oligarch, |
| 0:29.4 | Yevgeny Pergozim, and companies he controlled. |
| 0:32.8 | Pergozim is widely reported to have ties to Russian president Vladimir Putin. |
| 0:37.5 | And here's about a line and a half redacted that says harm to ongoing matter. |
| 0:42.2 | In mid-2014, the IRA sent employees to the United States on an intelligence-gathering mission with instructions. |
| 0:49.2 | Here's three lines redacted that says harm to ongoing matter. |
| 0:52.9 | The IRA later used social media accounts |
| 0:55.5 | and interest groups to sow discord in the U.S. political system through what it termed information |
| 1:00.4 | warfare. The campaign evolved from a generalized program designed in 2014 and 2015 to undermine |
| 1:06.4 | the U.S. electoral system to a targeted operation that by early 2016 favored candidate Trump and |
| 1:12.3 | disparaged candidate Clinton. The IRA's operation also included the purchase of political |
| 1:17.0 | advertisements on social media in the names of U.S. persons and entities, as well as the staging of |
| 1:22.4 | political rallies inside the United States. To organize these rallies, IRA employees posed as U.S. grassroots |
| 1:28.9 | entities and persons and made contact with Trump supporters and Trump campaign officials in the |
| 1:33.8 | United States. The investigation did not identify evidence that any U.S. persons conspired or |
| 1:39.1 | coordinated with the IRA. Section 2 of this report details the office's investigation of the Russian social media |
| 1:45.8 | campaign. Russian hacking operations. At the same time that the IRA operation began to focus on |
... |
Please login to see the full transcript.
Disclaimer: The podcast and artwork embedded on this page are from Dan Williams, and are the property of its owner and not affiliated with or endorsed by Tapesearch.
Generated transcripts are the property of Dan Williams and are distributed freely under the Fair Use doctrine. Transcripts generated by Tapesearch are not guaranteed to be accurate.
Copyright © Tapesearch 2026.

