Again, the question here is about presuppositions for sure.

And I've listed many things and many problems for the foundational approach that you're advocating.

You replied with something to the effect that, well, there's a trilemma that we could refer to.

And there's really not many other options here.

Well, the fact that you don't think there's many other options actually doesn't count as a justification for the starting point.

In other words, you started with properly basic beliefs.

And all I have to ask you is that do you think that the notion of properly basic beliefs themselves is self-evident?

Do you mean the idea, properly basic belief?

Well, if I said only beliefs that are self-evident or incorrigible or

evident to the senses are properly basic, the problem is that you're in an infinite circular regress

because the proposition itself in terms of it's, you knowing it, is not part of your sense data,

nor can you show that it's properly basic without assuming it.

Well, I would agree that the idea of a properly basic belief may itself not be properly basic, but one could just have self.

That's not what I asked.

Okay, what did you ask?

The proposition itself about properly basic belief, is it properly basic?

The proposition there are properly basic beliefs the proposition only beliefs that are self-evident or incorrigible or evident to the senses

are properly basic well I would just I would say that it's true you're saying

how do I know what properly basic beliefs are I didn't ask ask that it's true. I'm asking, is that notion itself properly basic?

So you're, okay, so you're saying that if it is properly basic, it creates some kind of circularity if I say that?

Yes. Okay. Well, I, as I said before, I don't know if the description of an idea might be properly basic,

but the experience itself is.

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