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rational security, chatter, law fair no bull, and the aftermath.

The back door is going to have to be protected by some kind of credential, a key.

Typically, when we're talking about encryption and law enforcement access,

what we're really talking about is escrowing keys.

In the 1990s, when the FBI was pushing clipper chip and in the first crypto wars,

the idea then was that a copy of the key would be kept by some neutral third party.

Not the phone company, not the government, but some kind of neutral party,

who would then receive orders from the government and then turn over the key.

It seems like now the government is pivoting towards a model where the companies themselves keep the keys.

They said, look, we don't want the keys. We just want to go to Apple and then Apple can do this thing for us when it happens.

And the problem with that backup key approach is that when you have this key,

people are going to try and steal it.

There's this cheesy line in the movie Field of Dreams, which is if you build it, they will come.

And time and time again, where back doors have been in place in systems,

the bad guys have gone after them.

I'm Benjamin Wittis, and this is the Law Fair Podcast, November 1, 2014.

That's none other than Chris Sagoyan, computer scientist, privacy and security expert,

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