Ironically enough it was the ruler of Iraq, Saddam Hussein,

RIP, he didn't say RIP, that would be funny if he did though,

who rescued the Navy by attacking Israel with Scud missiles during the Gulf War of

1991. This assault which occurred the Gulf War of 1991.

This assault which occurred on the background of information about the massive German

assistance to Iraq and developing its missiles and building its chemical and biological

arsenal led the German government to try to compensate Israel and

improve Germany's image in the West by agreeing to build Israeli submarines.

And this is further, I mean, you know, the idea of this being kind of born out of a weird German guilt,

it's, you know, its assistance towards Israel. This is echoed in a Rand analysis from the time for the U.S. Army, they said

that basically rather than setting forth policies that would reflect the state national kind of rational strategic interests of the

German state that they said quote the policy was set by issues as whether

Germans owed the United States political support in the Gulf in return for

American support during the unification process or whether Germany's historical obligation

toward Israel required it to act in a specific fashion, right?

So I'm saying all of this to kind of shade this very complex character of German national

identity post-unification.

And it sounds very weird because it's dialectical, right?

The Germans, at this point, they take a national pride they form their identity in just how good they are at confronting their past

Yeah

And it's this continued and renewed commitment to Israel throughout these ensuing decades

that demonstrate just how much the state was like ready and willing to exercise the Nazi past

...