Producer's note. I would like to thank Sean H. from Colorado and Lee Roy J. as they both pointed out very nicely

a mistake that I made on the last episode. Harold Betty Stark, the CNO of the United States Navy, was the chief of naval operations, not chief naval officer.

I can almost assure you this will never happen again.

Hello, and thank you for listening to the history of World War II podcast.

Episode 224. Climb Mount Nataca. Tojo gets his war.

Last time, Secretary of State Cordaul Hall, beyond tired of Japanese duplicity, as the Americans were able to read the messages coming from Tokyo,

Ambassador Namura and Special Assistant Kurosu, and knew that an attack of some sort was coming to American territory, coupled with a deadline, all the while the two representatives spoke of peace, issued what would become known as the whole note on November 26, 1941.

The document was proposing that Japan pull all of its troops out of China and Indochina, that only Chiang Kai-Shek's nationalist government be recognized in China, and the document once worked out was to be signed by all of those involved or affected by such a withdrawal.

The USSR, Japan, the United States, Britain, China, and Holland. Of course, Namura and Kurosu told Hall that Tokyo would never go for this, but Hall would not be moved. He had had enough.

In the back of his mind, he had already determined that this entire situation would have to be handled by the United States military.

To be fair, the military leadership in Tokyo was thinking the same thing. That same day, November 26 ended, with the United States Consulate in Tokyo advising all Americans to leave Japan as soon as possible.

The next day, November 27, Thanksgiving Day in the United States, FDR met with Namura and Kurosu as they had requested and Hall had made possible.

However, just before this meeting, Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall and CNO Chief of Naval Operations Betty Stark had sent the President a memo that read,

Japan may attack the Burma Road, Thailand, Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies, the Philippines, or the Russian Maritime Provinces. The most essential thing now from the US's point of view is to gain time.

The United States knew there would be war, and they seemed mostly unfazed by this. But at the same time, the country's leaders also knew the United States military was not ready for war.

Time was needed, and if the politicians could gain them that time, the more forceful could the American response be towards the Asian aggressor.

As for America's condescension towards Japan's desire of conquest and their military might, the US would soon enough find out that their assumptions were deadly inaccurate.

FDR, ever the continent politician, welcomed Namura and Kurosu into the Oval Office with a smile and an offer of cigarettes. However, on the inside, he was as angry as any other human being, who knew he was being lied to, to his face.

So he started out by saying that the American people desired peace in the Pacific, and it was his job to make that happen. But how could he possibly do so with the latest development of some 50 Japanese transport ships invading southern Indochina?

As in, I mean to say, what good is it to talk with you fine representatives when your countrymen back home keep invading new territory?

Yet Namura and Kurosu's hands were tied. Not only did they know nothing of the details of the coming attack, but the whole note, not unexpectedly, had been received in Tokyo as an ultimatum and a humiliating proposal.

And it must be said that the note made the work of the pro-war faction that much easier. Either Japan was to pull out of China and Indochina, thus ignoring all that had been sacrificed to gain those lands or stand up to the Americans in the British.

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