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This is the Partial Exam in Life, episode 307. Part 2, we've been discussing GE Moors,

a defense of common sense from 1925. So let's jump. Right back into that,

we had gotten into why we thought it was self-contradictory for philosophers to the 90s.

Common sense propositions, and that was because he thought that philosophers, when they made these claims,

were always talking about we, in some way, saying that none of these propositions are true for us,

so to speak, and that if that were true, there would be no us. There would be no we,

if there are no bodies, no other minds. There's no one to talk to.

So somehow something is implicated in the communication. Something is implicated in even the

very activity of making a philosophical argument. Something is implicated that ought not to be

contradicted. That's section one, Parts A and B, and then section two, if we want to make that

transition, we could linger on the other stuff a little bit more, but we could go into section two,

where... No, that's probably good. So that's page 45 in our version. This is another just

argument against idealists, against positions that he's not raising before us very clearly,

is I hold namely that there's no good reason to suppose either that every physical fact is

logically dependent on some mental fact, or that every physical fact is causally dependent on

some mental fact, that these would both be positions. You get why he's distinguishing these

two things. I mean, you can think that an idealist position would actually say that there are no

physical facts that they are, in fact, mental facts not be making some causal claim between them,

but alone a logical claim between them. I thought A was against the idealist and B was against

the skeptics. When he says physical fact, we could say that that is agnostic as to a metaphysics

...