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The Duran Podcast

End of US Hegemony - Jack Matlock (Ambassador to the USSR), Alexander Mercouris & Glenn Diesen

The Duran Podcast

The Duran

News

4.5738 Ratings

🗓️ 10 May 2024

⏱️ 42 minutes

🧾️ Download transcript

Summary

End of US Hegemony - Jack Matlock (Ambassador to the USSR), Alexander Mercouris & Glenn Diesen

Transcript

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0:00.0

Welcome to today's discussion. My name is Glenn Dyson. I'm joined by Alexander Mercurris and Jack Matlock, the U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, who had a very important role in contributing to negotiating an end to the Cold War in 1989. Welcome, sir. Hello, a good day. So, well, the topic we really

0:28.0

wanted to discuss today was the rise and the potential fall of American hegemony in the world.

0:34.8

And as after the Cold War, the US obviously had a choice between

0:40.3

embracing more a multipolar system or pursuing security based on the hegemony. And I would say

0:47.3

the choice of hegemony was chosen and justified based on what I would consider to be a genuine

0:52.3

objective of advancing a more liberal world order,

0:57.1

more or less according to Francis Fukuyama's ideas.

1:01.6

And now 30 plus years later, one gets the impression that neither hegemony or the mission of advancing

1:09.6

liberal democratic values are doing particularly

1:13.3

well as the US is experiencing more domestic problems while global primacy is contested more and more

1:22.9

by other states. So one can also argue that the hegemonic international system perhaps is

1:29.3

less capable of adjusting to shifts in the international distribution of power. So with this topic in

1:37.3

mind, I thought we could start with NATO as hegemony largely translated into NATO expansion. But Mr. Matlock, you and your

1:49.2

colleagues, such as George Kennan or William Perry, you were all, well, I would say fiercely

1:55.0

opposed to NATO expansion. In your words, at the time, I think you said it would go down in

2:00.4

history as the most profound strategic blunder.

2:04.5

So I guess I wanted to start off with two questions.

2:07.9

First, why did you see NATO expansion as being a strategic blunder?

2:14.6

And also, second, what do you make of them as you were there at the time?

2:21.3

To what extent was there made a promise to Gorbachev that this would not happen?

2:27.3

Yes, I did argue strongly along with a number of my colleagues. In fact, many of us who were in

2:37.7

senior positions when we negotiated into the Cold War, we argued that NATO should not expand.

...

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