We will hear argument this morning in case 24-783, NBridge Energy v. Nessel.

Mr. Bersh.

Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court.

This case arises from state officials' attempt to use State Court proceedings

to shut down an international pipeline that supplies energy to millions in the U.S. and Canada.

The question is whether federal courts retain their traditional equitable authority to excuse the 30-day

removal deadline. Under this court's case law and statutory text, they do. To begin, section 1446B is a

non-jurisdictional filing rule, a timing rule, that satisfies this

court's test in Young, because it prescribes a period within which certain rights may be enforced.

So, under Holland, the court's presumption, it presumes that federal courts retain their

traditional equitable authority absent the clearest command.

Next, the Michigan Attorney General cannot rebut that presumption.

Like Bechler, 1446B does not expressly prohibit equitable tolling, and its short 30-day

time limit is directed at the defendant, not the court, which is why it's placed in a procedural

section. As in State Farm,

Congress's decision to expressly direct a remand for lack of jurisdiction but not for procedural

defects suggest that courts retain their traditional equitable authority to excuse procedural defects.

And other equitable exceptions like waiver and estoppel apply to 1446B.

It would be incongruous not to allow equitable tolling, too.

Finally, the Attorney General points to so-called exceptions to the 30-day timing rule.

None rebut the presumption. Some simply define when the 30 days begins. Others were

adopted years apart to govern discrete categories of litigants or subject matter. None provide

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