We'll hear argument next this morning in case 24-482, Ellingberg v. United States.

Ms. Saharia?

Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, the MVRA classifies restitution as criminal punishment

and is thus subject to the ex post facto clause.

Just like imprisonment and fines, restitution is part of an offender's criminal sentence,

imposed at the end of a criminal proceeding as a consequence of conviction.

The sentence is the punishment for the crime.

Other features of the MVRA confirm this conclusion.

Restitution is intertwined with other punishments and can be the only punishment for misdemeanors.

Like fines, restitution is enforced with the threat of summary imprisonment,

and the federal rules of criminal procedure and the chapters of Title 18 that govern sentencing

apply. All of this is why in a trio of cases, Perylene, Pasquantino and Kelly, this

court called restitution a criminal punishment that serves punitive and penological purposes,

and a criminal sanction that furthers the

government's interest in rehabilitation and punishment.

Amicus responds that victim compensation is the primary purpose of restitution, but that

purpose-based analysis overlooks the threshold classification question. Does the statute on its face

imposed criminal punishment? The answer here is yes. Criminal punishments may serve multiple

purposes at the same time. Imprisonment punishes, but also protects the public. The same is

true of restitution. It punishes the offender and if the offender pays, compensates the public. The same is true of restitution. It punishes the offender and if the

offender pays, compensates the victim. Finally, this case presents the question presented.

The MBRA is the law being applied to petitioner retroactively. The district court that

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