Welcome to Defenders, the teaching class of Dr. William Lane Craig.

Today, the Doctrine of Creation, Part 17.

For more information and resources from Dr. Craig, go to reasonablefaith.org.

Today we want to look at David Hume's in principle argument against miracles. Now, despite its influence,

Hume's argument is generally recognized by philosophers today, in the words of the philosopher

of science, John Ehrman, as an abject failure.

Airman is a professor of the history and philosophy of science at the University of Pittsburgh,

not a Christian, not even a theist, and yet he recognizes that Hume's argument against

miracles is, as he puts it, an abject failure.

And what Airman means by that is that it's not just a minor mistake.

This argument is demonstrably, irremediably a failure.

Even Hume's admirers today try at most to salvage some insightful nugget from Hume's

convoluted discussion. Typically, Hume's maxim, and I quote, that no testimony is sufficient

to establish a miracle, unless this testimony is of such a kind that its falsehood

would be more miraculous than the fact which it endeavors to establish."

But as we'll see, even that maxim requires reinterpretation.

Now, Hume's in principle argument actually involves two more or less

independent claims. First, on the one hand, there is his claim that miracles are, by definition,

utterly improbable. Miracles are by definition utterly improbable.

Miracles are by definition utterly improbable.

Secondly, on the other hand, there is his claim

that no amount of evidence could ever serve

...