Welcome to Defenders, the teaching class of Dr. William Lane Craig.

Today, the Doctrine of Creation, Part 16.

For more information and resources from Dr. Craig, go to reasonablefaith.org.

The last time we looked at an assessment of the Newtonian world machine and the challenge that that posed

for belief in miracles. Today, I want to turn to the objections of Benedict de Spinoza.

Now, you'll remember that Spinoza's first objection to the occurrence of miracles was his objection based upon the immutability of nature.

It would be tempting to simply dismiss Spinoza's objection

on the grounds that he was a pantheist,

for whom the terms God and nature were synonymous terms. He would use the expression

in Latin, deus, sieve natura, God, or nature.

So, of course, miracles would be impossible on a pantheistic view.

A violation of the laws of nature would be a violation of God's nature because they are identical.

And the question is not whether miracles would be possible

on a pantheistic view, but whether they would be possible on a theistic view. But such a

refutation of Spinoza would be far too easy. The Tractatus, where this objection is to be found, is a deistic, not a pantheistic work.

And Spinoza presupposes the traditional understanding of God.

In particular, his argument is based upon the classic doctrine of divine simplicity, which states that God's knowledge, will, goodness, power, and so forth, are all really identical and one with his essence. The question that Spinoza raises in effect is if God's

knowledge is identical to God's will, then how can God's knowledge be necessary and his will

be contingent? They cannot have different properties

since they are the same.

Now, contrary to Spinoza,

classical theology did not claim

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