We'll hear argument next in case 2350, Chevroene versus the city of Napoleon.

Ms. Anand?

Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, everyone in this case now agrees that as the

lack of probable cause element of a malicious prosecution claim under the Fourth Amendment,

the charge-specific rule governs, that is, the plaintiff may make out a malicious

prosecution claim by proving that one charge is not supported by probable cause, even if other

charges are, provided, of course, that the plaintiff also makes out the other elements of the

claim. As no one appears to dispute, that charge-specific rule is supported, as Chief Judge Pryor put the point, by both centuries of common law and by bedrock Fourth Amendment principles.

That's all this Court needs to address to resolve this case.

Respondents urged this Court to go beyond that ruling to weigh in on a series of open questions about a

different element of the Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim that resulted in a seizure

element. No one disputes Mr. Chevroni is going to have to prove that on remand. But weighing in on

the kind of precise contours of that question would require this Court to go beyond the question

presented to address issues

not aired at all below that haven't percolated in the Court's appeal, and to do so on the

sort of briefing that doesn't have the kinds of text, history, common law arguments that you'd

expect before weighing in on an element of a constitutional tort. As in Thompson, this case

involves a narrow dispute over one element of a Fourth Amendment

malicious prosecution claim.

This Court should simply hold that a plaintiff can make out a claim by showing that at least

one charge lacks probable cause, again assuming they can make out the other elements

of the claim, and remand for consideration of everything else.

...