And so it's possible in the Chinese perspective that they could go and they could seize one of these islands, they could say, oh, you know, nobody really did anything and nobody really seems to care.

And so now that gives us a good sense as to what might be next. What could we actually go and escalate our coercive campaign?

But if you do seize Dong Sha, here are the consequences.

One, you will have to get into an armed conflict with Taiwan.

It will not be a bloodless coup domain.

Two, you will face a tighter counterbalancing coalition in the region.

And you will face economic sanctions of this type, and you will face economic sanctions of this

type, and you will face potential transactions of this type. And oh, by the way, like, here's

a sort of information campaign that we might launch against you. And here are a potential

escalatory option.

Hey, welcome back to the Modern War Institute podcast. I'm John Amble, editorial director at MWI,

and this episode features a conversation about Taiwan. Recent events in the region surrounding

Taiwan have generated a lot of attention. The discussion you're about to hear, however, looks

at it from a very specific perspective. My guest is Chris Doherty of the Center for New American Security.

He and his colleagues recently conducted a war game that sought to identify what strategic

options the United States and Taiwan have to deter a particular fade accompli move by China against Taiwan.

What they found is the best option is something they described as the poison frog strategy.

You get a chance to hear all about that strategy during the episode, but before we get to it,

a couple quick notes.

First, if you aren't yet following MWI on social media, find us on Twitter, Facebook, or LinkedIn.

It is a great way to stay up to date on all of the new articles, podcast episodes, and research

we're publishing every day. And second, as always, what you hear in this episode are the views of the participants

...