So Iran doesn't shape order, it doesn't project power.

And to my mind, it's not a great power. To do this, Iran would have to just be more than just a disruptor of international trade.

If we need to have things like a blue water navy, a conventional military that could actually be able to be deployed abroad,

an ability to produce, for example, advanced fighter craft and not

be dependent on China and Russia. It would have to be able to construct a regional order, which

is so no ability to do. It would have to have some form of international institution-making

capacity. It would have the need to have the ability to invest abroad, and it would just have to

have the ability to shape politics far beyond its region. Iran does none of these, and it would just have to have the ability to shape politics far beyond its region.

Iran does none of these, and it has none of these.

So I think the evidence is going to be much more difficult for you to suggest that Iran is a great power,

given the realities that I pointed out.

So there you go.

And you could take it however you want.

Thank you. Thank you for that wide-ranging Iran is not a great power spiel. But I think that's all

over the place. Let me give you a more systematic way of thinking about this question.

The three scholars that come to my mind when I think about this question of great powers and multipolarity and so on.

One is about, first of all, how did we go from a unipolar world to whatever we are describing as the multipolar world?

The obvious mechanical way in which you go from unipolarity to multipolarity is the rise of other great powers,

which you count as the pools, you count the number of these powers, and you said, this is the polarity of the system.

It has increased, and that is what has happened in the transition from a unipolar world to a

multipolar world.

Okay.

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