Yeah, I'd say there's certainly some fault to be shared across the board here.

You know, kelp with over a billion and client deposits can do better than a one-of-one.

And certainly we know at this point, a one-of-one is pretty frowned upon.

Then, of course, Layer Zero, who had their off-chain RPC infrastructure compromised,

perhaps they shouldn't allow the one-of-one to be the out-of-the-box kit for new

deployers on the OFT standard and perhaps pushback more.

I think the numbers show close to 40% of those unique OFT deployments are on that,

that one of one.

Really?

So you're saying that 40% of people that use this infrastructure still have that one

of one?

Not a total capital, but of unique OFT deployments. And a number have since been

upgraded as well following the exploit. And hopefully, we saw a lot of unique asset issuers who run

the Lair Zero OFT. They had to freeze their infrastructure as well to evaluate

any compromises on their end.

And then third, downstream for AVE when listing the RSE as collateral, perhaps, of course,

the one of one signer on the OFT deployment that could have been flagged as a risk

for the collateral listing and parameters adjusted accordingly for that.

Yeah, you would think, I mean, I know we're going to, I think in this conversation,

we'll get to things like circuit breakers or rate limiting.

But, yeah, all those things certainly could have helped.

So, Shandra, back to you.

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