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join the Declassified Club at the rest is classified.com. Why were MI6 in the CIA so quick to believe an unreliable source?

And could anyone back in 2003 have stopped the march toward war?

Well, welcome to the rest is classified. I'm David McCloskey. And I'm Gordon Carrara. And Gordon, we are on the fifth episode of this journey

into the story around Iraq, WMD. Last time, we spoke a lot about how both governments in Washington and London said about making

the public case for war, and in particular how the UK government put out this dossier to

as sort of a compendium of its best possible information on Iraq's WMD programs, how internally there was a tremendous

amount of consternation at the working levels of British intelligence around the quality

of that information, but how when that dossier came out, Prime Minister Blair's judgments

about WMD were very clear. It was beyond doubt that Saddam had WMD, and we left off

last time with the U.S. starting a very similar process to make the public case for war on the

basis of intelligence. And last time we talked a lot about the source that was alleging that there could be a launch of WMD for Iraq within 45 minutes.

And we're going to go deeper into some other dodgy sources in this episode.

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