Hey everyone, welcome to episode number 144 of our Civil War podcast.

My name is Rich.

I'm Tracy. Hello y'all. Thanks for tuning into the podcast.

With last week's episode, we wrapped up our discussion of the Battle of Kernstown,

which took place on March 23rd, 1862. We talked about how the fight at Kernstown had gone

badly for Stonewall Jackson, and we talked about the mistakes he had made there, but we

said that in the final analysis he had hit the federal's hard and achieved his main objective

of causing alarm in the Union High Command.

So although Kernstown was a tactical defeat for Stonewall Jackson, he had achieved a strategic

victory since the battle had important repercussions with regard to the war's eastern theater, specifically

with how it impacted McClellan's Peninsula campaign. Remember that as part of Little

Max grand plan for his big offensive for what turned into the Peninsula campaign, Nathaniel

Banks' force, Auden de Cheneyndo Avali, was slated to leave the valley virtually undefended,

as Banks shifted east of the Blue Ridge Mountains to cover the area around Manassas Junction,

where his troops would be part of the covering force tasked with protecting Washington, while

McClellan and the Army of the Potomac went off to capture Richmond. That was the plan

anyway, but...

But, that was before Kernstown. Before Kernstown, McClellan had been certain that Stonewall Jackson's

Little Rebel Army in the valley didn't pose any threat. But after Kernstown, after Jackson's

unexpectedly aggressive move in attacking Shields Division, Little Max decided that the pesky

Jackson would have to be dealt with sternly so that he would pose no more problems.

On April 1st, McClellan told Banks, quote,

...