Hello and welcome to the latest episode of the Battleground 44 series, where we analyse the events of the Second World War as they unfolded 80 years ago.

Today, we're looking at the Pacific Theatre, where, of course, many Americans were focused

after the traumatic events of the surprise Japanese attack on the US fleet at Pearl Harbor

on the 7th of December 1941, the event that brought the country into the war.

Their government, on the other hand,

agreed with Britain that the Allied strategy needed to be Germany first, that is, to defeat Germany and Italy and Europe first, before turning to deal with Japan. Saul, why do they agree to that?

Well, it seems the strategy was urged on the US President, frankly D. Roosevelt, or FDR, as he was known.

In November 1940, that's a full year before the US enters the war, by Admiral Harold R. Stark, the chief of naval operations,

who argued at the time that without the deployment of American military force in Europe, Britain was doomed to defeat.

The defeat of Nazi Germany was, therefore, to take precedence over any threat that might arise from Japan.

The policy, I should say, was supported by Admiral Ernest J. King, the commander-in-chief of the

U.S. fleet, who felt, along with the other joint chiefs, that Hitler's defeat would inevitably

be followed by the demise of

the other Axis powers, Italy and Japan. Conquering Japan, on the other hand, would have little

bearing on Germany's military prospects, particularly its Titanic struggle with Russia. Yet King was also

aware that Japan could not be left to run amok. To prevent this, at least some of the Allies' resources,

particularly naval, were needed in the Pacific. So the question was, as we go through the war, Patrick,

how big a share was needed for the Pacific. Now, King suggests 30% at the Casablanca Conference in January

in 1943. But even this modest amount was too much for field marshals at

Alan Brook, Britain's chief of imperial general staff, who envisaged, and I quote, minimum holding

operations in the Pacific while the war was won in Europe. Now, you might say the British were

bound to say that because, of course, their existential threat was in Europe. Roosevelt and the Joint Chiefs, even so, never seriously deviated from the Germany First Strategy,

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