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🗓️ 28 March 2011
⏱️ 70 minutes
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0:00.0 | Welcome to Econ Talk, part of the Library of Economics and Liberty. I'm your host Russ Roberts |
0:13.9 | of George Mason University and Stanford University's Hoover Institution. Our website is econtalk.org |
0:21.2 | where you can subscribe, find other episodes, comment on this podcast, and find links to |
0:26.5 | another information related to today's conversation. Our email address is mailadicontalk.org. We'd |
0:33.6 | love to hear from you. Today is March 14th, 2011, and my guest is Vincent Reinhart, resident |
0:43.2 | scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. Vincent, welcome to Econ Talk. |
0:46.8 | Thanks for having me. You recently published a provocative paper in the Journal of Economic |
0:52.2 | Perspectives, one of the main publications of the American Economic Association, and the |
0:57.5 | paper was entitled, A Year of Living Dangerously, the Management of the Financial Crisis |
1:02.2 | in 2008. The standard narrative of the financial crisis, which you challenge, the standard |
1:07.5 | narrative is the big mistake that the government made to precipitate of the crisis was the failure |
1:12.5 | to rescue Lehman Brothers. But you disagree with that, and you go back to the March 2000 |
1:18.2 | state rescue of Bear Stearns, which by the way, I think we're on the third anniversary |
1:22.2 | to the day as we're taping this. That's right. Why do you think the Bear Stearns decision |
1:28.5 | was so important? Bear Stearns set an enormous precedent. Lehman was made possible by the |
1:36.2 | decision previously on Bear. Bear Stearns had many of the similar problems. It had been |
1:43.4 | seen to be in trouble for a while, so that you would have thought that the private sector |
1:48.7 | had time to control their risk to bear. It was a firm that had a very illiquid balance sheet |
1:54.9 | on the asset side, and very short-term liabilities. It was a classic run. The government, that is, |
2:03.8 | the Federal Reserve, with the content of the Treasury, hated Bear Stearns, that built |
2:09.4 | up the expectations that made Lehman possible. Let's go back to the history a little bit, and I'm |
2:14.2 | going to take you back a little further than this. Further than this, when we get a little |
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