What I'd like to do is to make an apology at the beginning, and that's that I'd like to talk

about ancient texts and modern issues at the same time, and that's a perilous business.

And in particular, I realized only after thinking through this material that I was using a set of notions

without carefully distinguishing them enough.

And I think that's partly because they're hard to think about for ways that were brought

out, I think especially clearly in both Candace's unconscious talk.

So this is a family of concepts to do with desire.

And that's the word that I'm going to use the most.

But I'm also going to slip into talking about wanting,

talk about what we care about,

talking about love,

and also more generally about emotions.

And there's a reason for grouping these things together

in the Aristotelian tradition,

which is that Aristotle in some sense or another

wants to distinguish all of them from,

not reason, but reasoning.

I'm going to put on this side of the one.

At the same time, I think Aristotle wants to see these as potentially reasonable.

So not inherently reasonable.

In fact, reasoning isn't inherently reasonable either because you can reason badly.

But all of these things can be reasonable.

...