And the nature of knowledge is basically their epistemological accounts.

And specifically, I think what I mean, or I know what I mean, is that this concerns the possibility

of our apprehending specific objects, objects that we encounter by normal experience.

That pertains to both of these thinkers.

A broader consideration is the knowledge of nature, which I think is largely

a question I mean to attribute to Aquinas. What we know of things, how we know of things, what

they are, is their nature, which is something Kant and most of his contemporaries would take

exception. So the first glance, the title itself seems

rather unworkable because Kant, in terms of his Copernican revolution, says that not

that cognition conforms to objects, but that objects conform to cognition. And Aquinas readily holds

the truth as a conformity of the intellect with the objects.

So this place is Kant, or this place is Aquinas in a tradition.

He's not named by Kant. He's part of a tradition. I think he would lump him into that.

That Kant explicitly rejects. So the contrast is clear.

So the question is, what's to do with this? So despite the obvious contrast between these two, and I think even along with it, there are significant, even interesting points that help highlight both of these accounts of cognition in terms of the contrast.

So what I intend to do is begin with a review of Kant's account of cognition, the nature of cognition,

then proceed to Aquinas, his account of cognition, and then contrast these two accounts

endorsing, as you might suspect, by how I'm dressed, the Aquinas' approach to this, particularly how he understands the knowledge of entities.

So to begin with Kant's account of cognition,

it is because of the unknowability of things in themselves that Kant proposes that we account for cognition

not beginning with the object,

but by the interplay of the two faculties of cognition,

...