Hello and welcome to episode 220 of the unauthorized history of the Pacific War podcast.

My name is Seth Periden, historian and deputy director of the Mississippi Armed Forces Museum here at Camp Shelby, or actually not here at Camp Shelby, here at my

house. With me, as always, is my esteemed co-host, retired Navy Captain Bill Toady,

former skipper of the Fast Tech submarine USS Indianapolis, Commodore of Submarine

Squadron 3 at Pearl Harbor, and many other assignments. Bill, how are you this afternoon?

Also at my house.

This week we are happy to have a return guest with us again. You've probably heard of or seen his YouTube channel, I would imagine, as most people who watch this channel have.

He provides excellent doses of naval history, and we are glad to have him back with us today to talk about our topic.

Please welcome back, Drac and Feltzac.

How are you doing today?

I'm awake, which is a good thing, considering the time gap between where you guys are and where I am.

But we are all awake, alert, and happy and ready

to go. Excellent. Outstanding. We got a cool little topic to talk about here today, and we're

going to get right into it. So as General MacArthur and his U.S. Army forces advanced up to Solomon's

chain throughout 1943 as part of the Allied Grand Strategy

in the Pacific with eyes at least initially on Rabal as part of Operation Cartwheel.

U.S. Navy eyes set upon the Japanese-held island of Bougainville in November.

It had been decided that rather than invade what was known to be a heavily defended

area, that of course being the all-important Japanese naval base at Rabaul. Allied forces would cut that position off, let it wither on the vine,

so to speak. Still, pressure had to be kept on the Japanese basin. While Rabaul was already within range

of Allied aircraft, specifically medium and long-range bombers, another airfield was needed

to allow light bombers and fighter sweeps to occur on a more regular basis.

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