We'll hear argument next in case 23-367, Starbucks Corporation v. McKinney.

Ms. Blatt?

Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, Section 10J authorizes district courts to grant

preliminary injunctions that they deem just in proper.

10J thus requires district courts to apply the traditional four factors as set out in Winter v. NRDC.

This court should reverse.

The Court of Appeals held that Winter's four factors do not apply under Section 10J.

All that mattered below was whether any facts supported a non-frivolous legal theory and whether there was harm,

not whether that harm was irreparable.

The government argues that whether a two- or four-part test governs, statutory context compels district

courts to conduct, quote, a less exacting and more differential inquiry into the merits,

without undertaking an intensive effort to resolve factual issues.

But 10-J contains no language, much less clear language, diluting the traditional standard.

Preliminary injunctions are extraordinary and drastic remedies.

Here the Board seeks a coercive injunction backed by contempt sanctions,

and the Board seeks the very same injunctive relief

that it would get if it won the case. Such relief is highly inappropriate, absent a clear

showing under all four factors. The government justifies deference because the Board, not

trial courts, ultimately decide the merits at the back end. But Congress directed trial courts, not the Board, to apply the winter factors at the front end.

The Board hasn't even made any factual findings to defer to.

Agencies have no expertise whatsoever in how courts should exercise their equitable discretion.

Indeed, the Board, in its adjudicationication will not even consider the four winter factors.

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