This is John Batchel, a conversation with colleague Henry Sikolsky of the Non-Proliferation Policy Education Center,

asking a very difficult rhetorical question.

Why is it that we're on the eve of bombing Iran for a suspect nuclear weapons program and enriching uranium?

And we're on the eve of transferring that technology to Saudi Arabia.

Well, here's the question. Henry has much more to say on that matter. More than I.

Absolutely, in my mind. It surely is. And I think in a lot of other people's minds that are

reading and watching, which is not enough people

yet. Reuters put out a story yesterday that indicated that even though our Secretary of Energy at

the time in November when the Saudis came to the White House and a deal was struck on nuclear

cooperation, that that deal had, quote, unquote, nothing to do with enrichment.

Well, that sounded pretty good.

However, privately, they sent a note to the Hill saying, we want a waiver on the legal requirement that this program of cooperation be placed under what's called the additional protocol inspections,

which are tougher inspections than normal ones, that the International Atomic Energy Agency

has most respectable countries agreeing to.

Well, we want a waiver.

You know, Saudi Arabia is very, very important.

And we need to be able to export our nuclear reactors

to be able to keep the Chinese and Russians

from capturing the market of the world, blah, blah, blah, blah.

And then they go on to say, so we're going to have arrangements that involve the IEA in a

bilateral agreement to have inspections and verification that will prevent military

diversions of this material to make bombs.

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