This is CBSI in the world. I'm John Batchel. Elbridge Colby, the author of The Strategy of Denial.

This is imagining the future and a contest between the coalition led by the United States against the hegemon, China, and China's aggression towards Taiwan

and or the Philippines and or the rest of the coalition. There is now a disaster scenario,

and the denial defense obliges everyone to react in dire fashion. What is it that can keep the denial of defense from

failing or what is a predicate for the coalition after the failure or during the contest in which

either side could win or lose? I believe that's what we can now talk about as the binding strategy.

I'm very carefully reading Fonklazvitz because of you, Bridge.

And I find, thanks to your emphasis,

von Klausvitz talked a lot about psychology and about the resolve, the morale, the ambition, the passion of the contestants.

I believe that's part of the binding strategy.

How so?

No, I think you put your finger on it, John, right?

The issue that Clausewoods, of course, was a master of is that, you know, the strength itself is not the only

sort of factor that's relevant here. The question is how much and how avidly are the combatants

prepared to dedicate that amount of strength, right?

France, under the Bourbons in 1785 or something, the fervor of the French nation was much

more modest, right? Whereas six, seven years later, with the Leveille-Amau

and the mass popular support for the revolutionary armies and the defense of the nation and

so forth, you know, suddenly France was putting out a whole different type of

military strength and ambition and aggressiveness. And so, so the question here to put the point on

it is, you know, in this more difficult, much more difficult and challenging in a costly military

situation, in which either China has already seized Taiwan Taiwan or we see that in order to defend

...