We'll hear argument next in case 2367, Royal Canaan v. Walshleger.

Ms. Wellington.

Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, the Eighth Circuit's decision below is an extreme outlier.

It conflicts with the text and structure of Section 1367 and with more than a century of precedent.

Chief Justice Marshall held in Mullen against Torrance in 1824 that in a diversity

case, a federal court's jurisdiction, once vested, cannot be divested by subsequent events.

The Court extended that reasoning to removal actions and Kirby against American Soda in 1904.

In 1938, this Court held in St. Paul Mercury that if the plaintiff, after removal,

amends his pleadings, this does not deprive the District Court of jurisdiction

because the defendant's statutory right to removal should not be subject to the plaintiff's

caprice. The second Justice Marshall confirmed that conclusion in Carnegie Mellon against

Coughill in 1988, and Justice Scalia concurred in Rockwell in 2007. Respondents asked this

court to upset that settled interpretation, claiming that it conflicts with the text of Section 1367.

But Congress codified this Court's longstanding precedent in the text of Section 1367 itself, making

clear that if the Federal Court has original jurisdiction, it shall continue to have supplemental

jurisdiction unless Congress expressly provided otherwise.

Respondents cannot cite a single decision of this court, a single decision of a court of appeals

outside of the Eighth Circuit, or a single treatise that supports their position.

Respondents realize how weak their case is and instead asked the Court to decide something

else, whether Grable should be overruled, and if not, whether Grable's requirements were met.

This Court did not grant Sir Charari on either question.

Grable has settled law, and the Eighth Circuit correctly applied it here.

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