In conversation with my unbelieving son, this conundrum was presented.

If the best of all possible world's idea is true, then God's foreknowledge

actually does remove my free will. If God knows all things, including counterfactuals,

and chose to create the world that best served his purposes, then he knew every person's decisions

ahead of time. He chose this world over every other, so he chose the world in which I would

do P. Because he chose this world, I have no choice but to do P, which means my choice isn't free,

but determined by God's foreknowledge, which eliminated all other possibilities. In some other

universe I might have done Q, but God did not choose that universe. He chose

the one where I do P, and I cannot do otherwise. How would you respond to my son? Are we truly free?

Is this really the best of all possible worlds? Is this equation missing something crucial?

Thank you for your ministry, Dr. Craig. Tony, United States.

I've selected your question this week, Tony, for the sake of your son.

Even though I've already addressed this issue numerous times,

it appears that your son has been misled by the fallacious old argument for theological fatalism based on divine foreknowledge.

As stated, the argument has nothing to do with the idea of a best of all possible worlds.

That controversial notion plays no part in the argument.

Whether or not there is a best of all possible worlds, it remains the case that God has chosen

this world over every other and so knows every person's decisions ahead of time.

But then what justifies the inference, because he chose this world, I have no choice but to do

P. Where did that come from? Your son seems to be presupposing the argument for theological fatalism as follows.

One, necessarily, if God forenows P, then P.

Two, God for knows P.

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