This is John Bachelor speaking with my colleague Seth Fransman of the Jerusalem Post,

also the Foundation for the Defense of Democracy's,

his new book The October 7 War.

And here Seth gives us a very quick version not only of how the attack was organized

that day but why it took the shape that it did with all those hostages and

where the strike was meant to go and where it did go.

This is Seth Fransman, very carefully analyzing Hamas's plan on October 7th and how it changed. the More of this later this week. I think Hamas probably knew that if you kill a thousand people,

they were, that Israel will retaliate, you know, more than it had in the past.

I don't think Hamas actually,

I didn't think they would be so quote a

quote-unquote successful in its sense. They they assigned groups of

30 or 40 men kind of a platoon size to attack you know 30 or 40 locations on the fence, and then the guys were supposed to break through and get into these different things with seamen places.

And in most, in some cases, the groups succeeded, and when they did succeed then they started

massacring people. Usually Hamas passed those guys with

attacking the younger part of the equipment scene where young people were because

I guess they assume that those people would be easier targets or maybe something they might be soldiers so it would be better to kill them first and then they would usually go for the armory of the kibbutz because most of these kibbutz has had a location and full that had rifles that could be distributed but they knew where this was.

So you know the way if they were lucky and got in then they committed the massacre.

But in some cases they weren't lucky. There was one place like

who puts him again where a guy went out for a cigarette at 6.30 in the morning and

he saw them coming and he raised the alarm. And then they were the Hamas guys were

mostly killed. So Hamas had a, the plan was basically to send these teams in,

kill as many people as they could and then bring back to Gaza as many

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