This is the preview for the partially examined life episode 261 Part 2 covering personal identity

as depicted in Derek Parfits' Reasons and Persons from 1984.

I'm going to play two sections here, first is right at the beginning and pick up where

Part 1 left off.

Seth, you were going to talk a little bit about what he's actually trying to show with

his spectra plot experiments, which is that we ought to be reductionists, so how do they show that?

This is at the end of 85, not page, but section 85.

So, when we considered the psychological spectrum, which was Parfits' initial hypothesis,

the psychological continuity, when we considered the psychological spectrum,

Williams' argument seemed to show that psychological continuity is not necessary for personal identity.

Physical continuity would be sufficient.

When we considered the physical spectrum, a similar argument seems to show that physical continuity is not

necessary for personal identity.

Psychological continuity would be sufficient.

We could accept both of these conclusions.

We could claim that either kind of continuity provides personal identity.

Although this hybrid view is coherent, it is open to grave objections.

One objection arises if we combine not our two conclusions, but the two arguments for these conclusions.

So, yeah, so he's setting us up for the 86th, the combined spectrum.

Exactly, exactly.

But I think the key thing here is that this, I think, gets it part of what's really perplexing about this issue,

is that we can take each physical atom or piece and replace it with an identical one.

...