So with few exceptions, the discussion on moral enhancement is divided between two fundamental questions.

The first question being whether moral enhancement is even possible through, say, pharmacological means.

And under this first question, enhancement is understood, the actual enhancement is understood in either of two ways. Either the moral

belief gets enhanced by, say, getting true, or one's moral behavior becomes enhanced by, say,

comporting with pro-social attitudes or whatever they might be. And the second question is whether

moral enhancement is ironic or paradoxical

in the sense that doing so is itself immoral. And here, so if in fact belief enhancement or

behavioral enhancement is possible, is it really me who is enhanced? The question here might be is enhancement somehow

inauthentic in a morally objectionable way? Think of doping in sport, right? So my present project

actually straddles both questions in the following way, so I wish to argue that moral enhancement

is possible, not through drugs, it is possible,

but can only be rational and thereby satisfy authenticity concerns by means of an epistemically

humble action whereby the agent a sense to the testimony of an epistemic authority.

Now, to give the project some gravitational weight, I'm going to focus on belief enhancement.

So the scaffolding of my project here is to, well, first begins with a basic understanding of cognition and try to apply that to moral cognition. With this basic understanding is a backdrop, I motivate what I refer to as the

problem of the cognitive cul-de-sac. Very briefly, a very popular form of moral inquiry is reflective equilibrium, or RE.

RE recommends that we begin our moral inquiry with a set of considered moral judgments.

Those considered moral judgments are basic and they have a feel of being correct.

From these basic considered moral judgments,

we look for a stronger and wider network of supporting beliefs. That is, we look for a wider

coherence. Now relying on an argument from Michael DePaul, the problem with a cognitive cul-de-sac

is that the resulting network of beliefs is merely coherent.

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