I'm John Batcher with Germanicus, Michael Vlegos, I'm Gaius, we're in Londinium.

Kief is a straightforward problem.

The Londincki loses authority, they go to the polls, There's a new president. The negotiation begins.

Kief is reduced to a rump Ukraine. Dunbarz, Crimea, and more, perhaps all the way to Odessa, Novo Raskia, are Moscow's, Putin takes credit.

That's straightforward, but NATO, much more difficult.

Germanicus, I report to you two items to the last days. One, the foreign minister of Latvia,

the former prime minister, asserts that once Moscow gobbles up Ukraine or big pieces of it, Moscow will be coming for them for the old

Soviet states of the Soviet Empire. At the same time an article in foreign Affairs by Peter Schroeder, ex-CIA, now a think-tanker in Washington,

a Hawk, argues that tactical nuclear weapons are part of Putin and the Russian general staff's thinking.

Not for Ukraine, but in the event of full war with NATO, Moscow maintains that it's at war with NATO now.

NATO is not attacking.

I mention those two things because NATO is a product of the first Cold War. It is unclear to me whether it has a future here in the 21st century.

How do you see NATO answering this question.

What's the point if we lose Ukraine?

My feeling, as a former legate, a legionary leader in across the Rhine Germany would say to Europeans

re-examine the possibilities and opportunities

that were made that you were made aware of at the fall of the Soviet Union.

For the first time in four decades, there was a possibility of an entire European security order being

created by including Russia in NATO and for NATO then to transform from a

military alliance which was no longer needed after the fall of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact.

And so it would be more like a security framework, like the CSCE, for example, might have intended

to be, but such a PAC could not coexist alongside a military alliance whose focus was

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