ISC StormCast for Wednesday, February 16th, 2022
SANS Internet Stormcenter Daily Cyber Security Podcast (Stormcast)
SANS ISC Handlers
4.9 • 754 Ratings
🗓️ 16 February 2022
⏱️ 6 minutes
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Transcript
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| 0:00.0 | Hello, welcome to the Wednesday, February 16th, 2020 edition of the Sands and the Storm Center's Stormcast. My name is Johannes Ulrich, and today I'm recording from Jacksonville, Florida. |
| 0:14.1 | Quick diary today from Xavier looking at some of the bots that were hitting his mail server, kind of interesting |
| 0:22.3 | breakdown on where the bots are coming from and what onboarding systems. |
| 0:28.6 | They're running interestingly. |
| 0:29.8 | There appear to be a couple that are apparently associated with industrial control systems, |
| 0:36.2 | but, well, shouldn't really be a huge surprise that they get |
| 0:41.3 | infected as well and then used as bots in order to send Malware to mail servers, or in this |
| 0:49.4 | case just trying to brute force mail server credentials. |
| 0:55.6 | And Sophos has an interesting blog post with some details of new developments regarding the Skirlwaffle Malware. |
| 1:05.0 | This malware has first shown up September last year, and it has sort of specialized on vulnerable exchange servers. |
| 1:13.3 | So it uses the well-known proxy log-on and proxy shell vulnerabilities and exploits |
| 1:19.5 | in order to attack exchange server. |
| 1:24.2 | Once they have access to the exchange server, they'll inject themselves into email |
| 1:29.2 | threats and try to spread either malware or even then conduct a business email compromise. |
| 1:37.3 | Now, lately, apparently what is happening after the attacker is ejected from the exchange |
| 1:43.5 | server, so they got detected and the fraudulent accounts got removed. |
| 1:49.9 | They're now continuing to basically use the knowledge they gathered while they had access to the exchange server |
| 1:57.2 | to inject emails from look-like domains, and apparently at least in one case, |
| 2:04.3 | they were successful in getting a victim to trigger money transfer, which was luckily |
| 2:10.7 | blocked by a participating bank. So keep that in mind if you are running into an exploited |
| 2:17.3 | exchange server that even if the |
| 2:18.8 | attacker no longer has access to it, they may still use some of the knowledge they collect |
... |
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