4.4 • 7 Ratings
🗓️ 27 February 2019
⏱️ 20 minutes
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0:00.0 | Welcome to In Conversation, the regular podcast of E-Sharp magazine. Go to e-sharp.com. |
0:12.0 | For free access to all our podcasts to date. This is Paul Adamson, and I'm in conversation with Tony Connolly. |
0:17.8 | Tony Connolly is the Europe editor of RTE, the Irish broadcaster. Yes, Tony, |
0:22.0 | we are going to talk about Brexit, I promise you, but I'd rather start by not looking towards |
0:25.9 | the future, even the short-term future, but actually the past. As you chronicle in your book, |
0:30.8 | Brexit and Ireland, now in its second edition of May last year, the Irish government, before |
0:35.7 | Article 50 was triggered in March 2017, had this wind of |
0:40.3 | opportunity, if you like, or nine months of anxiety when they weren't quite sure what would happen |
0:45.3 | from their perspective and what extent the EU 26 would handle the upcoming Article 15 negotiations. |
0:51.3 | I mean, as you say in your book, but maybe it's been a bit of our listeners who haven't read your book. Tell us a bit about how the Irish government approached that |
0:57.9 | period between June 16 and March 17. It was a difficult period because the result was shocking |
1:06.6 | to the Irish government, but they had almost treated it as almost like a domestic referendum. |
1:12.6 | The government had put so many resources into following the campaign, and they had sent |
1:17.5 | ministers over to the UK to try and campaign as far as protocol permitted for a remain vote. And Dekeney, the T- the time was over quite a few times and he had got quite a good relationship with David Cameron but I think it gradually dawned on the Irish government very shortly before the referendum that this could go the wrong way from from their perspective so they they had done a fair amount of contingency planning, but I think |
1:49.4 | it's fair to say that their instinct the day after the referendum was to have a bilateral track |
1:56.2 | with the UK to try and figure out how this would be managed. |
2:01.6 | I suppose the government had prioritised the Irish peace process as the main collateral damage if there was a leave vote. |
2:09.6 | But they had looked at all of the implications for customs, for the agri-food industry, for energy. |
2:16.6 | So they had been scoping a lot of the issues, |
2:18.5 | and they had quite a detailed contingency plan in place. |
2:22.0 | But I think because of the very strong bilateral relations |
2:25.8 | between the two countries that had been at their zenith, |
... |
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