And the Hi, I'm Peter Adamson, and you're listening to the History of Philosophy podcast, brought to you

with the support of Kings College London and the Lever Hume Trust, online at

W.W.

History of Philosophy.net. Today's episode will be another interview with my

colleague here at King's, Professor M. M. McCabe. Hi, M.

Hi, M. Hi, Peter.

Today we're going to be talking about Plato's views on knowledge,

which is a topic I've been looking at in several recent episodes.

I was wondering whether you could tell me, for example, whether Plato thinks

that I could know the fact that I'm sitting in a chair right now talking to you. Is that the kind of

thing he thinks I could know? I think a lot of people would say that he thinks you can't know something like that because a lot of people believe that on Plato's account knowledge is determined by what it's of,

so that you can only know when you have objects of a particular specified kind.

I'm not sure that that tells the right story. I'm not sure that it

tells the story about why knowledge should be anything much that we care about in particular why we should associate

knowledge with virtue if we can't think of knowledge as having as its objects

the sort of ordinary mundane things like sitting in a chair.

But I think there is a problem for him with the idea that knowledge could be of something on its own like here I am sitting in my chair.

So there are two separate questions here it seems to me.

One of them is whether one thinks about knowledge in these strictly delimited ways that contemporary philosophy thinks about it,

so that you might think of knowledge in terms of I know that, some true proposition and I know it because I am justified in

believing it and so on and so forth or whether in fact knowledge is something

broader and wider than that.

...