4.7 • 4.3K Ratings
🗓️ 5 October 2009
⏱️ 67 minutes
🧾️ Download transcript
Click on a timestamp to play from that location
0:00.0 | Welcome to Econ Talk, part of the Library of Economics and Liberty. I'm your host Russ Roberts |
0:13.9 | of George Mason University and Stanford University's Hoover Institution. Our website is econtalk.org |
0:21.2 | where you can subscribe, find other episodes, comment on this podcast, and find links to |
0:26.5 | another information related to today's conversation. Our email address is mailadicontalk.org. We'd |
0:33.6 | love to hear from you. |
0:37.0 | Today is September 25, 2009, and my guest is Gary Stern, who just recently stepped down from |
0:45.6 | being president of the Minneapolis Federal Reserve Bank. He is the author with Ron Feldman |
0:50.2 | of the book Too Big to Fail, the hazards of bank bailouts. Gary, welcome to Econ Talk. |
0:56.0 | Thank you. Good to be with you. |
0:57.6 | Your book Too Big to Fail, which is the subject of our conversation, it changed my life. I don't |
1:05.2 | say that too often about books here in Econ Talk. Occasionally, I was in the Stanford bookstore |
1:10.4 | a few months ago, and somehow, even though they have a very large selection of economics books, |
1:16.7 | and they only had one copy of yours, and it was just the spine showing. It wasn't face out, |
1:21.2 | as they say in the business. But the title was Big Print, and it caught my eye, and I thought, |
1:26.2 | well, Too Big to Fail, I need to know more about that. I picked it up. I didn't know much about |
1:31.1 | the history of bank bailouts, and I saw that it was written, I think, in 2004, and figured, well, |
1:37.6 | that was a while back. It's probably not so relevant, but I leaf through it, and I thought, |
1:41.7 | I need to understand this, so I bought it. It really helped me understand what I consider the |
1:48.0 | fundamental question and questions of the financial crisis, and listeners have heard me ask about |
1:56.2 | this many times. Why would a firm, like Bear Stearns, or Lehman Brothers, or Fannie Mae, take so |
2:03.0 | much risk? Why would they be so leveraged? Why would they put themselves in a position where a bad |
2:10.4 | quarter would kill their firm? Why weren't there more natural forces of prudence to restrain them? |
... |
Please login to see the full transcript.
Disclaimer: The podcast and artwork embedded on this page are from Library of Economics and Liberty, and are the property of its owner and not affiliated with or endorsed by Tapesearch.
Generated transcripts are the property of Library of Economics and Liberty and are distributed freely under the Fair Use doctrine. Transcripts generated by Tapesearch are not guaranteed to be accurate.
Copyright © Tapesearch 2025.