Your argument next today in case 23-861, Feliciano versus the Department of Transportation.

Mr. Tut.

Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court.

This case turns on the meaning of the word during.

Under the differential pay statute, the government must provide differential pay to its civilian employees who also serve in the

reserves when they are called to active duty under a provision of law referred to in Section

101 A13B of Title X. Section 101A13B refers, among other provisions, to any provision of law during a war or a declared

national emergency.

Thus, during a national emergency, reserve is called to active duty under any provision

of law, must receive differential pay.

The government resists this common sense temporal definition of during, the same definition it argued for in Rassam.

Instead, the government says, during here means, quote, in the course of, end quote.

And in the course of, it says, requires a substantive connection between a reservist military service and a pending national emergency.

That is wrong for at least three reasons.

First, it conflicts with the ordinary and conventional meaning of the word during, which is virtually

always purely temporal.

Second, it doesn't work in the statutory scheme, which asks only whether a

reservist has been called to active duty under a provision of law referred to in Section

101, A13B, something that doesn't depend on the reasons the reservist was called to active duty.

Third, it would create an impossible line drawing problem to figure out what it means to have a sufficiently substantive connection to qualify for differential pay.

Not just for courts, not just for agencies, but for private employers who will face criminal

penalties under 18 U.S.C. Section 209 if they get the question wrong. The government has

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