Hello, and thank you for listening to the history of World War II podcast, episode 537, General Manstein's backhand blow.

Last time, with southern Russia, mostly cleared of enemy troops,

though some were contained, the twin operations of Star and Gallup had resulted in the recapture

of Kursk, Belgarod, and Karkov. Celebrations throughout Russia followed this, of course,

but the leading Soviet units that had accomplished this were exhausted by their efforts.

Meanwhile, Manstein, now in command of the reconstituted Army Group South, was given leeway by Hitler to react to this latest crisis as he saw fit.

And what Manstein saw was opportunity. By now, the Russians were

thinking of raputista, that spring thaw that would turn everything into mud, and thus movement

would be all but impossible. And the reason that this season of mud was focused on was that

from Stalin's point of view, the enemy was on

the run. His proof for this, not that he knew the extent, was that during the Battle of Karkoff,

though Hitler had ordered that the city beheld, to the last man, to the last bullet,

63-year-old General Paul Hauser, commander of the first SS-Panser Corps,

who had two of his three Panzer Grenadier divisions still in Karkoff, nevertheless ordered

them to withdraw on February 15th, just before the last corridor was closed by the Soviets.

On the other side of the chessboard, there was

another summation, but again not knowing the extent, Manstein was guessing that the enemy had lost

much of its armor in this recent fighting between those being destroyed and those in need of repair.

And he was right. The Southwestern Front had lost

half of its armor. General Popov's front mobile group of four corps was down to 53 operational

tanks. As for General Golinko's Veronath Front, his third tank army, only had six battle-worthy tanks left. The point is,

at this moment, mid-February, 1943, it was Manstein, was reading the overall tactical situation

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