Pan, pan, pan, pan, pan, pan, pan, pan, pan, pan, pan, pan, pan, pan, pan, pan,

scicast.

For the interval, rudely interrupt this, Philip, I think you had something you wanted to say.

Yeah, I thought so I probably wanted to agree with Anil that, yes, there are so many things we can capture

about the structure of our experience in quantitative terms in the ways he articulated

the various color similarity spaces of colors.

But I don't think you can fully convey that the qualities that fill out that structure.

You couldn't convey to a blind neuroscientist what it's like to see red, that the redness

of the red experience. And this is not because we haven't done enough experiments, it's because

you've just got two very different kinds of concept here. The concept you have in physical

science are sort of broadly speaking. The concepts you have in physical science are sort

of broadly speaking, behavioural concepts. They describe what systems do and what their parts do.

Whereas if you think about the concepts we use when we think about our experience, the redness

of a red experience, smells, taste, these aren't behavioral concepts in any sense.

And so they're just very different kinds of concept.

And I think because of that, you can't build a kind of explanatory bridges between the two

that I think Anil would like to.

I mean, you can build some expansey bridges.

But I think, as he said, it's not going to be exhausted.

I mean, I think this is probably

where me and Laura would agree that there is very different kinds of concept. Where I disagree with Laura is, it seems to me, a position is sort of just giving up on explanation. It's sort of, it's just a kind of brute identity, and that's the end of it. So I think actually they're both half right. So if you go with a nail that we do need explanations but you go with Laura that you know these are just

radically different kinds

...