From 1948 to 1973, there was a tremendous amount of conventional warfare in the Middle East.

The Arabs thought they were pretty good.

They thought they could use conventional force.

And they tried it against the Israelis, against each other.

And what they figured out during that period of time is actually we're not great at this.

The two outliers, the two guys who don't get it, Murmark Gaddafi, Saddam Hussein, you know, fight losing war after losing war and wind up getting overthrown in the end because they don't ever get it.

Hey, welcome to another episode of the Modern War Institute podcast. I'm John Amble,

editorial director at MWI, and my guest in this episode is Ken Pollock.

He is a military analyst and the author of a brand new book called Armies of Sand

that examines the question of the effectiveness of Arab militaries.

Specifically, and to be blunt, it grapples with the question of why they have really not performed very well on the battlefield.

As you'll hear, though, it's a bit more complicated than that, and there's arguably nobody

better equipped than my guest in this episode to discuss the issue, and also to offer some

thoughts on what it all means for regional stability and security or for U.S. strategy in the

Middle East.

Before we get to that conversation, just a few quick notes.

First, if you aren't yet following MWI and social media,

find us on Twitter, Facebook, or LinkedIn.

It is the absolute best way to stay up to date on all of the new articles,

podcast episodes, and research we're publishing every day.

And second, as always, what you hear in this episode are the views of the participants and don't

represent those of West Point, the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. government.

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