You're listening to Partiously Examined Life, episode 365, part two, continuing to discuss Max

Schellers and the nature of sympathy. We're now well into part two talking about love. Yeah, did we want to crank back as we look more

closely into the text itself to part one in there? I don't know. Was there anything in chapter

11? Because we read chapter 11, the relationship of love and fellow feeling. Some of it is

kind of foreshadows what we get in more detail here.

But I think we've said enough now about love to make sense of what he's saying here.

I mean, one of the primary points right is that you can't derive love and hate from fellow feeling or in general from the concept of benevolence.

And I think one of the points he wants to make, it kind of, you know, it's kind of contra-utilitarianism,

is that where in benevolence we might be seeking a kind of benefit for an object,

especially a material benefit. We want to redistribute the

resources, for instance. Love isn't seeking any kind of material benefit. It's concerned

strictly with the personality in this technical sense. And he makes other points. This is where he

makes a point. You know, you can love things

like knowledge and God, but, you know, obviously you can't have benevolence towards knowledge

or God. That doesn't make sense. Benevolence involves superiority and can even be insulting

under certain conditions. I'm just looking for quotes that I picked out.

Page 142, we often have fellow feeling for someone we do not love.

In conveying our regrets to someone, for instance, there's no trace of love, nor is there

in our ordinary pity for him.

But even here, the stirrings of sympathy are based on love, a love which in these instances

relates either to a whole of which he is a part or member. But even here, the stirrings of sympathy are based on love, a love which in these instances relates

either to a whole of which he is a part or member, a family, a nation, or mankind, or else to a

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