You're listening to the partial exam in life episode 348 part 2. We've been talking about the ideas of Tim Williamson on knowledge first epistemology we're in the middle of considering in detail a chapter in the Rutledge

companion to epistemology 2010 by Williamson just in the

idea of knowledge of epistemology, referring back to his ideas from his knowledge

and its limits book from 2000.

And I think we had gotten through the idea were there any other

comments on the position that he's arguing against sees the mental as somehow transparent or he uses the term luminous, that mental states are things that if you're having them, you know you're having them, right? If I'm in pain, I know I'm in pain.

Many philosophers have, right?

Sartre even argued that Freud's unconscious didn't even make sense because for exactly

this reason that he thought what the mental is all about is that it is transparent and Williamson is arguing that even something like

pain is not transparent so definitely you wouldn't think something like belief or evidence

or anything else that goes into epistemology wants to say that knowledge really is a mental state.

It is not partly mental because it's transparent and then partly not.

In fact, the whole thing, every component of it, every, if you want to say they're components at all is not transparent.

So if you want to say you should always moderate your beliefs in time with the evidence, well, you don't actually know exactly what you believe and you don't

exactly know what the evidence is even though you think you might but you know there your

belief is going to have maybe words in it and those words have references and things that are outside. have

maybe words in it and those words have references and things that are outside your immediate

consciousness. The evidence is going to be like knowledge itself.

What you think might be evidence might not really be evidence, right?

So there's no such thing as a pure seeming, you know, at least that has any knowledge content.

Yeah. Yeah, right. What seems to be evidence may not be

evidence. So, but he wants to identify evidence with knowledge, with what you

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