Learn about the big books in continental philosophy with my new fall class.

Please visit partially examine life.com slash class for details. Hey, this is a partial exam in life episode 344, part two. We just discussed Getty A's Is Justified True Belief Knowledge.

I think now we are going to turn to Alvin Goldben's 1979 paper,

What is Justified Belief, as a way of trying to fill the whole to respond to those

Getty A problems and of course the problem of what justifies a belief is much more

fundamental than just the fact that Gettyettier came up with these weird exceptions

of that you believe something truly but sort of by accident not because you had any good

reason but you know so what is it to actually have the good reason is what

Goldman's gonna get out here yeah so the way he frames the problem he doesn't frame it as

hey I'm trying to solve the Getty A problem.

What he wants to do is to give a reductive account of justification.

And that means giving non-epistemic substantive conditions for what it means to be

justified and what do we mean by non-epistemic in other words you can't just

epistemic terms include terms like justified, warranted, having good reasons, knowing something's being probable.

If you're going to explain justification, you don't just want to kind of circularly appeal to similar

notions in the same way that ethics right in ethics we might want to look at non-ethical conditions for the rightness of actions.

For instance, something's being productive of happiness.

That's the comparison he uses.

You don't say it's ethical because it's good.

Yeah.

We want to look at what are the substantive conditions that allow

us to say use this word justified and it'll turn out and as we mentioned to be of

...