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Hey, you're listening to partially examined life episode two twenty three part two. We're talking to Ned block

About some essay soon as book block as we had just finished rhyme with locklands essay could an android be sentient and Ned's reply to that

We're gonna talk for the rest of the time about Michael ties essay homunculi heads and silicon chips the importance of history to phenomenology

And Ned's response to that fading qualia response to Michael tie and really we're talking about

Chalmers absent qualia fading qualia dancing qualia paper which we did troubles with functionalism and then we immediately did

The Chalmers paper so we really tried to hash through what Chalmers argument is but there seem to be in ties presentation in your response

Some substantial steps forward in that argument

Yeah, so the issue is could there be a

Zombie who's functionally like us but has nobody home no phenomenal consciousness

So chalmers who is not a functionalist but who has a certain affinity to functionism

He's what is sometimes called a nomological functionist

He thinks that it's part of the set of laws in the actual world that there's a perfect correspondence between functional states

and phenomenal consciousness

so

He produced this really interesting argument

It's meant to be a broadly empirical argument that functionalism is true in the actual world

That's assumed for the sake of argument there could be a zombie in particular. Let's suppose you could take a person conscious person

He calls him conscious Dave and slowly replace bits and pieces in the head

And end up with a unconscious zombie called the cosm I think robot and the clever thing about how he does it is the way the

Slow replacement is supposed to go people had earlier discussed various kinds of replacement scenarios

...