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The Partially Examined Life Philosophy Podcast

Ep. 222: Debating Functionalism (Block, Chalmers) (Part Two)

The Partially Examined Life Philosophy Podcast

Mark Linsenmayer

Casey, Paskin, Philosophy, Linsenmayer, Society & Culture, Alwan

4.62.3K Ratings

🗓️ 5 August 2019

⏱️ 52 minutes

🧾️ Download transcript

Summary

Continuing on Ned Block's "Troubles with Functionalism" (1978) and David Chalmers's "Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia" (1995).

What would it be like to be halfway between person and machine? If you think the machine can't have consciousness, then Chalmers thinks that there's no sensible way to describe such an experience, ergo the machine (if functionally equivalent to the person) must have consciousness after all.

Listen to part one first, or get the unbroken, ad-free Citizen Edition. Please support PEL!

End song: "Machine" by Helen Money as interviewed on Nakedly Examined Music #101.

Transcript

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0:00.0

The partial exam in life depends on your support.

0:02.6

To find out how to do that and ways that are cheap or even free, go to

0:05.9

partiallyxamonlife.com slash support.

0:08.5

You're listening to the partially examined life episode 222 Part 2.

0:21.4

We've been discussing dead blocks troubles with functionalism 1978

0:25.6

in David Chalmers 1993 essay, absent quality of fading quality of dancing

0:30.2

quality. We were just trying to figure out whether

0:33.4

Chalmers response to blocks absent quality argument made any sense

0:38.4

his response of fading quality. The idea that according to the functionalist

0:43.0

you could have me and then a robot version of me where all the parts are

0:48.1

swapped out for silicon and according to the absent quality argument

0:52.6

that's at least positive that these two are functionally equivalent but yet

0:57.3

one me has full on qualia the not me does not you could imagine

1:02.2

swapping out piece by piece to go from one to the other and what would be the

1:06.5

status of the in between what would be like to be in between and you

1:10.9

just express that some reservations about that making sense.

1:15.8

Right you pose this hypothetical functional equivalent thing that doesn't have

1:19.8

qualia. Chalmers says okay well if I start trying to replace parts of the

1:25.6

functionally equivalent thing with real parts of you or vice versa at what point do I lose the

1:31.9

qualia if I'm changing you or what point do I gain it if I'm changing the simulacrum.

1:37.2

Think of it as a continuum and then the question is if that is intended to be a thought

1:44.5

experiment that counters the intuition that you could conceive of something that's

...

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