We will hear argument next in case 24-416, Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Zook.

Ms. Ross.

Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, Section 6330 of the Internal Revenue Code is all about levies,

using the word levy nearly 30 times.

The statute provides a levy-specific exception to the general rule the taxpayers

must pay their taxes first and dispute them later in a refund suit. When the IRS proposes

to collect a tax by levying on the taxpayer's property, that is, by seizing and selling it,

Section 6330 allows the taxpayer to dispute that particular

method of collection before it occurs. A taxpayer cannot use Section 6330's prepayment mechanism

unless the IRS seeks to levy on her property. The proposed levy is her ticket to the IRS's

appeals office and later to the tax

court. But the tax court is one of limited jurisdiction. Under Section 6330, Congress has

given the court only the power to review the appeals offices, quote, determination, end quote,

whether a levy may proceed, where, as here the IRS no longer has a basis to enforce

its proposed levy, the tax court lacks jurisdiction, just as it would lack jurisdiction

if the IRS had never proposed a levy at all.

Respondent contends that even after the levy has dropped out of the case, the tax court may

continue to consider arguments about

the taxpayer's unpaid tax or underlying tax liability. But in this case, the IRS cannot levy

on the taxpayer's property because she has already paid, so there is no unpaid tax or underlying

tax liability. And more generally, the statute instructs the Appeals Office to consider

those subsidiary issues only in service of making the ultimate determination whether a levy

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